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Abstract 
In the core of the transition in Eastern Europe is the change of enterprise gover-
nance with a change in the distribution of ownership rights on the different stakeholders 
involved in the enterprises. What has been the role of different types of ownership 
structures for the success of this restructuring process? Ownership of five different 
stakeholders is analyzed: state, employees, managers, domestic outsiders and foreign 
investors. The ownership changes are analyzed over four different stages of the 
transition process.  
It is shown how employee ownership played an important role in the first stages 
of transition in some countries. Management ownership has been decisive for the 
dynamics of SMEs. Domestic outside and foreign ownership have grown with the 
progress of transition and play an increasing role for restructuring. The role of each 
ownership type is analyzed both from a theoretical point and with presentation of some 
of the empirical evidence on performance and restructuring. There is mostly referred to 
the experience in the Baltic countries, but evidence fro m Russia, Slovenia and other 
transitional countries are also included. Both theory and evidence put state ownership 
on the low and foreign on the high level of performance and restructuring. For the 
question of insider versus outsider the picture is less clear. The weight of different 
ownership structures are changing over the different stages, the change follows the 
governance cycle from state to employee, to manager, to outside/foreign ownership. 
The speed of change and the weight of different types is to a high degree a political 
question. The paper ends up with a list of policy recommendations. 
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Introduction – four stages of reform 
The transition process in Eastern Europe means a fundamental change of 
institutions both at the macro- and micro level. In the core of transition is the change of 
enterprise governance with a change in the distribution of ownership rights on different 
stakeholders involved in the enterprises. These changes influence enterprise 
performance and restructuring of production, which is also a key element in the 
transition process. 
What has been the role of different types of ownership structures for the success 
of this restructuring process? I will try to answer this question mainly based on the 
evidence we have collected in the three Baltic countries. If relevant I will also refer to 
some of the evidence from other transition countries in Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union.  
The transition and the development in governance structure and restructuring 
have run through four different stages: 
Gradual reforms in the pre-transition stage. Gorbatjov’s reforms in the second 
half of the 1980es gave more autonomy to managers in state owned enterprises and 
opened up for the first market oriented semi-private entities: new cooperatives, small 
individual firms, a few joint ventures with foreign capital, and possibility for employee 
to lease their enterprise. The Baltic countries were leading in this process of early 
reforms. Other East European countries such as Poland and Hungary had implemented 
more radical market reforms with the start of small private production entities and more 
openness to the Western world. The most comprehensive reforms were implemented in 
the former Yugoslavia already in the 1960’es with a high degree of enterprise autonomy 
and liberalization of prices and foreign trade. The self-management model meant that 
the ownership rights of control and income were transferred to the employees. This 
happened especially in the northern part of Yugoslavia, first of all Slovenia, while the 
strong party involvement prevailed in the south. These early reforms had a strong 
influence on the transition process after 1989. Because of the early reforms Hungary 
could implement a quite slow gradual reform process and still be the frontline reform 
country compared to Czechoslovakia with a much more conservative planning system 
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as starting point. Slovenia avoided most of the civil war, and was already in the early 
stages able to benefit from the market reforms of earlier years. When excluding East 
Germany taken over by the BRD, Slovenia is the richest country in Eastern Europe 
measured per capita.   
The fundamental changes in Eastern Europe in 1989 and the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union in 1991 were soon followed by liberalization and start of privatization of 
the economy. With the liberalization of prices and foreign trade and the dissolution of 
the planning bureaucracy the enterprises got autonomy to start a process of market 
adjustment. Although the state still formally had the dominating ownership position, the 
liberalization and increased autonomy of the state enterprises resulted in a de facto 
transfer of some of the ownership rights to managers including a strong increase in the 
managers’ control position.  
The core stage of privatization was done with varying speed and methods in 
different transitional economies. In fast privatization countries such as Lithuania, Czech 
republic and Russia the peak of privatization was around 1993-94, while in more slow 
and gradual privatizations in Hungary, Poland, and Estonia the peak was in 1994-96. 
The privatization process followed different paths in different transitional economies 
because of differences in political development and other initial conditions connected to 
specific culture, history, technology, location etc. The formal rights of ownership was 
transferred from the state to different groups of owners with insiders as the core groups 
in countries like Lithuania, Russia and Slovenia, while outsiders, especially foreign 
investors, had a dominating role in countries such as Hungary and Estonia. 
Deep restructuring and integration into the global economy is the stage, which 
the most advanced transitional countries went into in the second half of the 1990’es. 
The early stages of reform were followed by a steep fall in production when enterprises 
performed reactive restructuring – that is, adjustment to the shift in cost and demand 
structure with cuts in production and employment. Later stages of transition included 
new products, new production methods, new organizational structures, new markets etc. 
This deep or strategic restructuring was both a process of starting new enterprises and 
of restructuring existing enterprises. To build up this new production structure it was 
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necessary with new capital, technology, management skills, and networks. It was also 
necessary that the governance structure gave the managers and the owners new 
incentives and instruments to perform this strategic restructuring. Different ownership 
and governance structures (including the institutional environment of the company) had 
different impact on the process of restructuring.  
In this paper I will analyze ownership by the following five stakeholder groups: 
state, employees, managers, domestic outsiders and foreign investors. A specific form 
of ownership is defined as the complete dominance of a specific stakeholder group. 
Whether it is 100% ownership, majority with more than 50% or just dominating with a 
higher ownershare than other groups will be specified when relevant. Each section will 
first give a short overview over the diffusion of the specific ownership type by location 
and over time, then follows a short theoretical discussion in relation to restructuring and 
finally some empirical evidence is presented. In the end I will conclude and give some 
recommendations and perspectives for different types of ownership/governance in the 
transition process. 
 
 
State ownership and restructuring 
Since it was not possible to privatize all State owned enterprises overnight there 
has been a period with widespread state ownership in all transitional countries. 
Privatization of small enterprises was rather fast leaving the larger enterprises for state 
ownership for a longer period. In some countries also large privatization was rather fast 
leaving only relatively few state enterprises in strategic sectors such as infrastructure, 
energy and other utilizes. Also the privatization programs were not successful in selling 
all enterprises. Sometimes the most problematic enterprises were left in state hands. 
Sometimes the state postponed privatization of strategic enterprises with a strong 
market position and relatively high profitability. Therefore, the performance of state 
owned enterprises depends on, which state owned enterprises were left after the first 
rounds of privatization. Different paths of privatization can thus mean quite different 
results for empirical studies of different ownership structures. This is related to the 
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socalled selection bias: whether the causality goes from ownership to performance or 
from performance to ownership structure. 
When the economy is liberalized the scope for management decisions increases 
concerning prices, products, markets etc. Although the profit formally belongs to the 
state, many state owned enterprises retain and reinvest their surplus. In this way part of 
the right to profit effectively belongs to the enterprise under the control of management. 
In case of losses state owned enterprise may have a hard budget constraint so deficits 
are not covered by the state or state banks. The final result can be non-payment of 
wages or ultimately a liquidation of the company. However, there is often a soft budget 
constraint for state owned enterprises with state subsidies covering losses, acceptance of 
tax-arrears, or soft loans from state banks. This may result in lack of financial discipline 
in state owned enterprises, Boycko et al (1996). 
 There is a strong governance problem in state owned enterprises because the 
managers often have de facto control, while the financial returns belongs to the state. 
The manager has limited incentive to secure the return for the owners. Instead the 
manager can maximize personal utility by following own goals. Ultimately, this means 
that managers have an interest in tunneling values out of the company to a company de 
facto owned by themselves or their relatives. Therefore, restructuring is expected to be 
quite weak in state owned enterprises. However, liberalization of the economy and the 
following commercialization of state owned enterprises may put more competitive 
pressure on state owned enterprises and improve efficiency (Yarrow 1986). 
The empirical results are not completely as negative as the theory suggests. Early 
results from Poland showed that a group of state owned enterprises also performed quite 
strong restructuring in the early years of transition, Pinto et. al (1993). One reason was 
that Polish state owned enterprises were under quite tough budget constraints. Some 
results for Russia, like Brown and Earle (1999), also show that state owned enterprises 
are doing relatively well in a general declining economy. However, the bulk of the 
research for Eastern Europe shows that state owned enterprises are doing worse than 
privatized enterprises. Claessens and Djankov (2002) analyzes 6000 enterprises in 7 
East European countries and find that privatized companies have higher growth in sales 
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and labor productivity with increasing effect over time after privatization. The superior 
performance of privatized firms in transitional economies is confirmed in a recent 
survey on empirical studies by Megginson and Netter (2001). Analyzing early 
privatization in Slovenia (Smith et al 1997) shows that both enterprises fully privatized 
to insiders and to foreign owners show higher productivity than enterprises continuing 
under social ownership. Frydman et al (1999) shows for a set of enterprises from 
Hungary, Poland, Czech and Slovakia that the longer periods of time since privatization 
means better performance measured as average growth in sales and other variables. We 
have used the same model for the Estonian data (Jones and Mygind 1999b). The model 
has quite low explanatory power and most of the results are insignificant. However, the 
results confirm that state owned enterprises have lower sales growth than privatized 
enterprises. In another study of the Estonian panel of around 660 enterprises for the 
period 1993-97 Jones and Mygind (2002) show that state owned firms have 15-22% 
lower productivity levels than private enterprises. In a cross section analysis for all the 
three Baltic countries covering the mid 1990es (Jones and Mygind, 2000) the results are 
quite mixed. However, those results that are significant go in the direction of state 
owned enterprises being less efficient than private.  
 
Employee owned enterprises 
Employee owned enterprises are not widespread in the Western developed 
economies. The exceptions are a high number of producer cooperatives in Italy, France 
and Spain (Bonin et al 1993, Uvalic 1991), and notably the Mondragon cooperatives, 
which are industry leaders in the Basque Country (Thomas and Logan 1982). Also the 
ESOPs in US comprising around 15 mill employees show the increasing importance of 
this type of ownership (Blasi **).  
Employee ownership became surprisingly widespread in the early stages of 
transition (Uvalic and Vaughan Whitehead 1997). It was the dominant ownership 
structure in Russia (Estrin and Wright, 1999), Lithuania (Mygind 1997) and Slovenia 
(Uvalic 1997), but also widespread especially in smaller and medium sized enterprises 
in countries like Estonia, Latvia (Mygind 1997), and Poland (Jarosz 1994). This was 
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both the result of privatizations and the limited opportunities for different forms of 
outside ownership in the early stages of transition (Mygind 2001a). Note, however, that 
this was just the initial type of ownership. In all countries except for Slovenia there was 
in the following years a strong tendency away from employee ownership toward 
management ownership and in some cases a further development to outside 
concentrated ownership (Jones 1998, Estrin and Wright 1999, Mygind 2000, Mygind 
2002). Managers bought shares from employees at quite low prices. Employee 
ownership was also diluted because the steep fall in employment meant that many 
retired employee owners became outside owners, while new-coming employees very 
seldom became new owners (Kalmi 2002). The data shows in this way a typical 
“governance cycle” from employee ownership – to manager ownership –in some cases 
ending up with core outside ownership (Mygind 2002). 
Why became employee ownership so widespread in the first years of transition? 
Three main explanations are given below: 
Following Marxist tradition it can be argued, that ownership by employees 
excludes the possibility of a capitalist owner exploiting the workers. Thus, it was 
possible to promote this type of ownership already when the socialist ideology 
dominated political life. This was the case with the self-management system in the 
Yugoslav economy and the “new cooperatives” and “leasing by the worker collective” 
in the former Soviet Union.  
According to the official ideology the working class formally owned the 
enterprises in the command economy. When decentralizing the ownership rights after 
1989/91 the ownership should thus be transferred directly to the employees in the 
enterprises. This was part of the political arguments in Russia, Lithuania and to an even 
higher degree in Slovenia, where privatization opened up for a continuation of self-
management in the form of employee ownership. However, the self-management 
system was based on collective ownership, where the labor-collective had the rights to 
control and the rights surplus. The individual employee could not sell his/her share 
when leaving the enterprise. The new type of employee ownership was based on 
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individual ownership, where each employee owned shares, which could be sold and 
give the employee a capital gain. 
Finally, the conditions with weak legislative institutions and weak capital 
markets in the early stages of transition meant that outside investors were in a weak 
position leaving most of the playing field for insiders (Mygind 2001a).  
The traditional theory of the so-called “Illyrian firm” predicts inefficiencies such 
as:  adjustment problems, underemployment and underinvestment (Ward 1958, Domar 
1966, Vanek 1971, Meade 1972). However, these predictions were based on the 
Yugoslav model of collective ownership. The change to individual ownership means 
that maximization of income per employee is parallel to maximization of the value of 
the individual shares, that is profit-maximization with the same expected behavior as 
the normal textbook company (Mygind 1992). However, this result is based on quite 
strong assumptions of a perfect market for individual shares as well as a perfect capital 
market in general. Under more realistic assumptions there are limitations in the 
transferability of individual shares implying an element of collective ownership. 
Therefore, the specific goals of employees in relation to wage and job-security may 
imply a behavior of the company in the direction of the Illyrian firm: Reluctance of 
cutting employment may be a barrier for reactive restructuring. Risk concentration, lack 
of capital from the owners and problems of alignment of goals with other investors 
(especially banks) may contribute to lack of capital, underinvestment, and  lack of deep 
restructuring in employee owned enterprises. Heterogeneous workforce may cause 
conflicts and hamper the decision-making process (Hansmann 1988). 
These failures of employee owned enterprises are widely referred to in the 
mainstream analysis of employee ownership, and most economists like Aghion and 
Blanchard (1998) conclude that manager ownership is more efficient than employee 
ownership, and that outside ownership is the most efficient structure, especially if it is 
concentrated. The positive side of employee involvement is often neglected in this 
analysis, but it can be argued that employee ownership results in higher motivation and 
enhanced organizational performance (Ben-Ner and Jones 1995). Mutual monitoring 
may dominate the problems of free-riding, which was emphasized by Alchian and 
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Demsetz (1972). The agency problems between owners, managers and employee will 
be substituted with alignment of interests, and shorter governance chains will be an 
advantage in the typical transitional situation of inefficient institutional framework 
(Stiglitz 1999). Reduced turnover and increased incentives for employee-owned firms 
to invest in specific human capital can also improve productivity (Mygind 2001a). 
Note, that some of the beneficial effects of employee ownership concerning alignment 
of interest, motivation, lower turnover etc. may appear also with minority employee 
ownership.  
These arguments make it difficult to predict whether employee ownership is a 
plus or a minus for performance and restructuring. Overall it can be expected that the 
weaknesses will prevail when considering high capital intensive sectors combined with 
a weak capital market, while the positive side may be dominating in sectors based on 
high inputs of human capital (Mygind 2001b). However, the complexity of the different 
factors points to empirical investigations to be the final benchmark.  
Most theories about employee ownership assume that the employee owners de 
facto control the enterprise and their goals are reflected in the behavior of the company. 
However, in most countries in Eastern Europe a paternalistic type of management was 
prevailing in the command economy, and after the formal takeover by employees the 
managers continued to dominate decision-making (Earle and Estrin 1996, Jones 1998, 
Mygind 2002, Kalmi 2002). This is a serious governance problem of separation 
between management control and the financial ownership rights belonging to 
employees. Like in the state owned enterprise the manager have both the opportunity 
and the incentive to transfer values from the employee owned enterprise to his own 
pockets. The short governance chain and the information level of especially higher 
educated levels of employee may make it more difficult for managers to appropriate 
assets in employee owned firms compared to state owned enterprises. Both theory and 
empirical evidence from the West indicates that active participation of the employees 
improves efficiency (Conte and Svejnar 1990). This combination of ownership and 
employee participation is part of the background for the success of the Mondragon 
cooperatives (Thomas and Logan 1982). Such participation is seldom found in Eastern 
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Europe. The only exception was the self-management system in the northern more 
developed parts of Yugoslavia, including Slovenia, where the employees de facto 
participated in decision-making and selection of managers. This experience gave 
Slovenia a better background for successful employee ownership compared with other 
transitional economies.  
 The overall success of the Slovenian transition can be taken as an indicator that 
an economy with a strong base of employee ownership can be competitive. The relative 
bad performance of Russia also with a strong employee owned sector can be taken as a 
counter example. The low employee participation and management domination in 
Russia compared to the strong participation in Slovenia is probably the main 
explanatory difference. 
 The micro based empirical literature is in general quite negative in relation to 
employee ownership. Djankov and Murrell (2002) in their meta-analysis merging a 
serie of different empirical analyses find that worker ownership belong to the worst 
group of enterprises in relation to restructuring. In their survey on empirical literature 
Megginson and Netter (2001) also conclude that employee owned enterprises are 
underperforming compared to outside owned enterprises. On the other hand show 
studies for Slovenia that employee owned enterprises are performing relatively well.  
Smith et al 1997 find for Slovenia early transition (1989-92) that both increasing 
employee ownership and foreign ownership is connected to higher productivity. Later 
studies like Prasnikar et al (2000) find no major differences in the strategic restructuring 
between insider and outsider owned enterprises. 
For the Baltic countries we have the deepest analysis for Estonia, but also some 
more preliminary evidence from Latvia and Lithuania. The problem of reverse causality 
of performance determining the choice of ownership structure we have analyzed for a 
large Estonian panel (Jones and Mygind 1999a). We find that large and capital intensive 
firms are much more likely to be owned by outsiders. Insider owned enterprises have 
from the start a bias in the direction of low capital intensity and low size. Notably, there 
are no significant results concerning performance causing the type of ownership. Insider 
owned enterprises can neither be assumed to be cream-skimming the best opportunities 
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nor to be more likely to appear as defensive takeovers where the economic prospects 
are bad from the start. 
Baltic employee owned enterprises perform better than state owned enterprises 
and domestic outside owned enterprises: In the Estonian panel analysis employee 
owned enterprises had levels of factor productivity only slightly lower than 
management owned enterprises, on the same level as foreign owned enterprises, and 
clearly higher than domestic outside owned enterprises and state owned enterprises 
(Jones and Mygind 2002). In a summary of different analyses (both multivariate and 
simple descriptive statistics) for the three Baltic countries (Mygind 2000) find that the 
results vary much depending on which variables are used as measure for performance. 
When using labor productivity as a measure employee owned enterprises are following 
the sample average while for factor productivity they belong to the highest group of 
efficiency. This can be explained by the fact that employee owned enterprises have 
relatively low capital intensity and investment measured per employee. This is also 
confirmed by recent case evidence (Mygind 2002). Lower capital input may mean 
lower labor productivity, while total factor productivity remains high.   
The earlier mentioned typical “governance cycle” from employee ownership – to 
manager ownership – ending up in some cases with core outside ownership show that 
employee ownership in the Baltics and in Russia is not stable and lack attractiveness for 
the owners compared to management ownership. At the same time it shows that this 
type of ownership is not a barrier for ownership changes. Insider ownership in the initial 
stages does not establish a strong path dependency, which blocks further reforms. This 
result contrasts the predictions by Blanchard and Aghion (1996). Insider owned 
enterprises lack capital and have low investment levels, but case study evidence from 
the Baltics (Mygind 2002) show that insiders are eager to attract outside owners with 
capital for restructuring. 
 
Management owned enterprises 
Enterprises majority owned by managers make up the most frequent form of 
ownership in the West. It is the classical start up form of the entrepreneurial firm. It is 
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most frequent in small enterprises and later in the governance cycle, when the company 
has grown larger, outside investors play a greater role. In the traditional command 
economy management ownership was not legal. However, at some point micro 
enterprises or individual enterprises – one-person-firms were legalized in certain 
sectors. Still, the next step of employing wage-earners was against traditional Marxist 
ideology. However, the new cooperatives with employee ownership made it possible for 
managers to develop firms with more workers. In many cases this ownership form was 
just a cover for de facto control by the manager.  
Soon after the political changes in 1989 in Eastern Europe and 1991 in the former 
Soviet Union it was made legal to start up new enterprises without narrow restrictions 
on who could be the owner. In most cases new enterprises were started by owners 
directly involved in management. Wild privatizations and legal privatizations of small 
enterprises contributed further to the development of manager ownership. In some 
countries there were advantages for broader employee takeovers in the small 
privatization. This was the case in Estonia and Latvia in 1992-93. Later on these 
advantages were taken away. It was more difficult for a small group of managers to take 
over a large enterprise, but there are examples of such takeovers in the Baltics. 
However, insider privatizations of larger enterprises most often involved a larger group 
of employees. Then followed a period of a gradual concentration of ownership in the 
hands of a group of managers and high level employees (specialists). In a later stage in 
the governance cycle, either connected to a crisis or to a need of extra capital for high 
growth, external investors may take over part of the ownership. Such changes can be 
observed in the Baltics although still on a  limited scale (Mygind 2000 and 2002).  
Management ownership is an elegant solution of the governance problem since 
there is no separation of control and financial owner-rights. The managers have a strong 
motivation to use the assets in an efficient way. On the negative side there is a 
concentration of risk in the hands of the manager, possible lack of resources such as 
capital and in some cases also management skills. Management takeovers rarely bring 
access to international networks. Such takeovers may conserve the existing structure, 
not open up for the necessary shifts of unqualified managers. The managers miss the 
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counter-play from a strong external owner. Therefore, the quality of the managers play 
a core role for the quality of management and thus for performance and restructuring. 
The process of establishing management ownership often functions as a selection 
mechanism: The processes which demand a proactive initiative will only be made the 
most entrepreneurial managers: such as establishing a “new cooperative” in the Soviet 
time, starting a new firm or organizing a spin off from a state owned enterprise in the 
early years of transition. Also a management-buy-out of employees demand some 
proactive action from the manager (Carlin and Landesmann 1997). Privatizations 
strongly favoring insider ownership like in Russia involve just a reactive action to be 
expected also from managers without much entrepreneurship and skills for restructuring 
enterprises. 
In Russia the frequency of new enterprises is quite low (OECD 2002) and 
therefore most manager ownership are found in old privatized enterprises. Seen in this 
perspective it can be expected that manager ownership may not be so successful in 
Russia. This is in fact confirmed by studies such as Brown and Earle (1999) and the 
merged studies by Djankov and Murrell (2002). However, other studies by the World 
Bank (2002) strongly emphasize that new small enterprises are important elements in 
strategic restructuring since they are more productive than existing enterprises. The 
most successful restructuring countries like Poland and Hungary has a high frequency 
of small new enterprises. It can be assumed that most of these enterprises are owned by 
their managers.   
Our studies for the Baltic countries show that management ownership is doing 
quite well. In the panel study or Estonia by Jones and Mygind (2002) management 
ownership has in fact the highest factor productivity of all ownership types.  
 
Outside domestic owned enterprises 
 Domestic outside investors have in most transitional countries played a less 
important role than in the West. Well-functioning diversified share ownership is closely 
connected to a well-functioning capital market not yet existing in transitional countries. 
The voucher privatizations gave some elements of this type of ownership, but most 
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shares were pooled in investment funds resulting in some concentration of ownership. 
Such investment funds play an important role in countries like Czech Republic and 
Poland. Other domestic blockholders were quite rare in the first years of transition. A 
period of accumulation of capital was needed. This happened through different 
channels: successful management owned enterprises, access to cheap state owned 
natural resources bought for low state regulated prices and sold at much higher world 
market prices, tunneling of assets from state owned enterprises, exploiting state loans 
with negative real interest rate, use of networks in the privatization process to acquire 
state resources at very low prices. This happened mostly through channels where the 
capture of the state of a small elite was a key element. The oligarchs in Russia are well 
known for this type of capital accumulation, but there were elements of such behavior 
in most countries. The Russian oligarchs established Financial Industrial Groups with a 
bank in the core of the group and with concentrated shareholdings in a number of large 
industrial enterprises.    
 In the Baltic countries diversified outside owners have developed in relation to 
the voucher programs, which only involved minority shareholdings in Estonia and 
Latvia, and in Lithuania outside owners were to a high degree crowded out by insider 
domination. Another source of diversified owners were employee owners leaving their 
firms without selling their shares (Kalmi 2002). But diversified outside ownership 
resulted only in rare cases in majority outside ownership. Strong external domestic 
blockholders were also quite rare, but there are some examples especially in Latvian. 
The theoretical predictions for outside ownership depend on the degree of 
concentration of ownership and the type of external owner. In Eastern Europe with 
undeveloped capital markets and relatively weak position of diversified shareholders 
there is a strong governance problem of separation of control going to managers and the 
financial ownership rights going to weak diversified shareholders. There is a free-rider 
problem since each of the small owners does not have enough incentive to collect 
information and perform monitoring of the managers. This is why we usually find 
outside ownership connected with a quite high concentration of ownership in the hands 
of a strategic investor.  
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The type of stake in relation to the company also plays an important role. 
Especially financial stakeholders such as banks and investment funds are interesting. 
Banks can benefit from combining the interest of lower risk on loans through better 
access to information. However, if a bank has dominant control it can be expected to 
follow a more risk-averse investment strategy than ordinary shareholders (Schleifer and 
Vishny 1999). For investment funds the second order governance problem of who 
monitors the monitors is the core question. If such funds have a dominant position and 
the diversified shareholders of the funds do not control the administrators of the fund, 
these administrators can appropriate rights by tunneling values from the portfolio of 
firms to firms under their direct ownership. This happened in the Czech system of 
investment funds and an important reason why restructuring in the Czech republic was 
lacking behind. Dispersed ownership and governance problems in investment funds and 
state funds caused also problems for many large Slovenian firms in the years following 
privatization (Gregoric et al 2000), but in spite of this Slovenia has been doing quite 
well in the restructuring process. 
The evidence for outside domestic ownership points in the direction of quite high 
performance/restructuring compared to other types of ownership (Frydman et al 1999 
and Megginson and Netter 2001). Djankov and Murrell (2002) find that outside 
blockholders including investment funds and banks belong to the highest category of 
performance. Notably, this is especially the case for CIS countries probably related to 
quite strong performance of the Financial Industrial Groups. For the Baltic countries 
outside domestic ownership is in general doing worse than insider ownership. This is 
the case in the panel study on Estonian enterprises (Jones and Mygind 2002), and also 
the growth of sales for a large group of Lithuanian enterprises show worse performance 
for outside domestic ownership (Mygind 2000). 
 
Foreign ownership  
There were a few examples of market oriented FDIs starting as Joint Ventures in 
some specific sectors already before the changes in 1989 and 1991 in countries such as 
Hungary and Romania, and a few in the USSR. In the early stages of transition some 
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investors took the chance to use the first mover advantages on the new market, but the 
main wave came in relation to large privatizations in the countries that opened up for 
direct sale to foreign investors. This happened first in countries like Hungary and 
Estonia, but later most other countries including Latvia and Lithuania also opened up 
for direct sale to foreign investors. However, it was not enough to offer state owned 
enterprises for sale. There is a close connection between FDI and advances in the 
general reform process with consequent stabilization and liberalization with clear rules 
of the game. The hesitant and low foreign investments in Russia and other CIS 
countries are both the result of slow progress in the transition process and privatization 
methods favoring insiders and domestic investors. Slovenia was also reluctant in 
opening up for foreign investments, but reforms progressed quite fast. 
Foreign core owners are normally analyzed separately from other types of outside 
blockholders because foreign investors have specific advantages in relation to 
restructuring of the enterprises (Meyer 1998): Foreign strategic investors have a much 
better supply of capital both from internal sources and from their relations to 
international financial networks. Foreign investors are normally in a strong governance 
position in relation to management. A foreign takeover often means a shift of 
management. Foreign investors are also strong in supply of new technology and 
integration into international production chains both in relation to supplier networks and 
in relation to market access. On the negative side specific local conditions may play a 
role: such as cultural barriers in relation to local employees and barriers for integration 
into the necessary local networks primarily in relation to the state bureaucracy.  
If the institutional setting is fragile with a weak state captured by local investors 
the lack of a leveled playing field means a disadvantage for foreign investors and results 
in relatively low of foreign investments. There is a close relation with the level of 
foreign investment and the conditions for foreign investors related to the development 
of transition. The transition frontrunners such as Hungary, Estonia, Poland and the 
Czech Republic have also the highest FDI/capita. Russia and most other CIS states have 
not offered foreign investors similar opportunities and FDI has been rather low. In 
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Russia domestic Financial Industrial Groups dominate the financial sector as well as 
heavy industry, energy, and raw materials.   
The privatization methods play a key role for foreign investments. Direct sale 
favors investors with good access to capital including first of all foreign investors. 
Therefore, they played a key role in privatizations in countries like Estonia and 
Hungary, but in later stages they also had an important role in countries like Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland and the Czech Republic. The success of the transition and 
restructuring in Estonia and Hungary is in fact to a high degree related to the high 
foreign investments. Foreign enterprises have been leading in installing new 
technology, developing new organizational structures and new markets.  
Most studies on the enterprise level confirm that foreign owned enterprises are 
leading in performance and restructuring. In a few studies there is no significant results, 
but no studies show significantly lower performance by foreign companies. (see 
Djankov and Murrell 2002, Megginson and Netter 2001). For the Baltic countries we 
found in the Estonian Panel that foreign owned firms were in the top group for total 
factor productivity together with insider owned enterprises, while outside owned 
enterprises and state owned were lagging behind. The results from other studies 
(Mygind 2000) for all three Baltic studies show that foreign owned enterprises had the 
highest labor productivity and wages and the highest investment levels. They had from 
the start the highest capital-intensity. This explains that labor-productivity is higher, but 
total factor productivity only on the level of insider owned enterprises. 
 
Conclusion: Ownership cycle - perspective and policy recommendations 
The connection between governance structure and restructuring is quite complex 
both in theory and in relation to the empirical evidence. The analysis also showed that 
different ownership structures play different roles in different stages of the transition 
process. The changing roles of the different ownership over the four stages is 
summarized in table 1: 
State ownership can be challenged on many aspects from a theoretical point of 
view and the evidence from transitional economies support the prediction that state 
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owned enterprises underperform in relation to other ownership types. Privatization is 
justified in most cases. However, privatization cannot be performed as a big bang, but 
must be seen as a long- term process. This process can start already in the pre-transition 
period as reforms increasing the scope of action in the state owned enterprises and 
opening up for market adjustment of prices. This happened in fact in Hungary and 
Yugoslavia and was an early start of the transition process. The first privatizations 
concerned spin offs and small enterprises. It took several years before the bulk of 
enterprises went through large privatization. In between was a period of 
commercialization where state owned enterprises functioned in the more or less 
liberalized market economy. State owned enterprises were met by competition, and they 
could respond by adjusting production, prices and markets. An important condition for 
success in this period was the implementation of hard budget constraints for these 
enterprises and opening up for competition from domestic and foreign entrants. 
Successful liberalization combined with effective stabilization could secure the first 
stages of restructuring and turn the falling production to new growth like it happened 
quite early in Poland in spite of slow implementation of large privatization. The slow 
privatization process gave time for building up the institutional framework of: 
legislation, enforcement, capital market etc. to secure a well-functioning enterprise 
governance system necessary for the large privatization to be a success. The 
privatization or liquidation of some of the most problematic enterprises in mining, 
heavy industry and the privatization of some strategic enterprises in infrastructure and 
utilities were postponed to the consolidation stage. Some enterprises in sectors like 
health, education, and research continue to be state owned. 
An important part of deep restructuring is done through the entry of new 
enterprises covering gaps, which were not filled by the command economy. In some 
countries like Poland, Hungary and later even in the Soviet Union this process started 
already in the pre-transition period. This was the early introduction of insider 
ownership, both as employee owned new cooperatives and with the start of manager 
owned micro enterprises. 
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Employee owned enterprises have in this way been in the early frontline in the 
transition to the market economy. Most important was this process in the northern part 
of the former Yugoslavia with a quite developed and open market economy with a high 
degree of employee participation in ownership rights. Here lies the background for the 
successful transition of Slovenia, today the richest economy in Eastern Europe.  
In most countries employee owned enterprises continued to have a role in small 
enterprises and also in relation to small privatization. In some countries like Russia, 
Lithuania and Slovenia employee takeovers was the main method of privatization of 
medium and larger enterprises, still leaving the largest enterprises to outside investors. 
This type of insider takeovers have been criticized by mainstream economists, but the 
theory of the restructuring potential of employee owned enterprises is quite ambiguous. 
There are negative predictions in relation to employee goals, supply of capital and 
investments, but advantages in relation to alignment of interests and employee 
motivation. The evidence is also mixed with quite negative results from Russia and 
some central European countries, but more positive results from Slovenia and the Baltic 
countries. A general tendency for employee ownership is low capital intensity and quite 
low investment because of lack of capital. Total factor productivity is not lower than for 
outside owned private enterprise.  
 In most countries with widespread employee ownership the managers continued 
the paternalistic tradition from the command economy. The employee owned 
enterprises were de facto controlled by management, and the governance cycle for 
many of these enterprises has been management buy-outs and transformation to 
management ownership. Such a takeover eliminates the governance problem of 
separation of control and financial rights, but the distributional conflict between profits 
for the owners and employee wages returns. It does not solve the problem of lack of 
capital. However, the change to management ownership happens in a later stage in the 
transition process with a more developed banking system with increasing potential for 
supplying also insider owned firms with loans. Still, lack of capital may push the next 
step in the governance cycle to more outside ownership. The quite dynamic change of 
ownership does not confirm the fear of insider ownership blocking for outside owners. 
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Employee ownership can play an important role in early stages of the transition and 
then change to other forms.  
Although such dynamic change certainly shall be an opportunity. There are also 
potential benefits for later stages in keeping and developing the more participatory form 
of employee ownership. Therefore, it cannot be concluded that advantages for 
employees in the shall be avoided. It is a political decision how to balance the 
conditions for different types of owners in the privatization process. The employees 
could be given the opportunity to invest some of their money/vouchers in their own 
firm, to make it a pro-active decision to establish employee ownership. It can be 
recommended to establish specific supporting institutions to exploit the advantages of 
employee participation. The experience from the successful Mondragon cooperatives in 
Spain shows the importance of clear rules for employee participation, access for new 
employee to be owners, emphasis on training, access to bank loans for employee owned 
firms. In the right institutional framework employee ownership can be an important 
element of the future consolidation process with further restructuring and developing of 
more advanced production based on a high content of human capital. This can both be 
in the form of full employee ownership and developed enterprise democracy and in the 
form of minority ownership for motivation of key employees. 
Management ownership has played an important role for restructuring in most of 
the transitional countries. Starting with individual enterprises in the pre-transition 
period and developing fast in the early stages of reform with full liberalization of entry 
of new firms and with small privatizations. The most successful transitional economies 
like Hungary, Poland, Estonia and Slovenia has a very dynamic SME sector mainly 
based on management ownership. Full liberalization removing red tape, licensing, and 
prohibitive taxation as well as the creation of possibilities for training, consulting 
services, financial institutions strengthen the possibilities of entry of new firms. The 
strong differences in development of SMEs in different countries in transition are to a 
high degree related to the quality of the state. SMEs do not need an advanced 
development of the capital market and the overall corporate governance institutions. 
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Therefore, it is also possible with fast development in the early stages where the SMEs 
fill many of the gaps left from the command economy. 
Is there is a trade off between developing a well functioning SME sector and the 
political goal of high equality? The dynamics of the SME sector of managerial (family) 
owned enterprises can be hampered by excessive taxation. The experience from Russia 
is that much regulation on start-ups gives special opportunities for already established 
firms, limits competition, promotes corruption and ends up in high inequality combined 
with low dynamics. The dynamic development of Estonia combined with quite simple 
regulation and low level of corruption is an advantage for the whole society including 
lower income groups.  
The full ownership incentives can only be developed if the ownership rights are 
clearly defined and enforced. Russia has had a long period with uncertainty around 
property rights and here is one of the main reasons behind the widespread asset 
stripping and capital flight. Managers took out short term profits because it was unclear 
who would benefit from more long term oriented investments and restructuring. 
Domestic outside investors play only a limited role in the first stages of 
transition. Diversified domestic ownership cannot function because the capital market is 
not developed, and strong domestic blockholders are rare because there have been too 
little time to accumulate capital. However voucher privatizations promoted elements of 
this type of ownership in some countries like the Czech republic. Most voucher-shares 
were pooled in investment funds resulting in some kind of concentrated outside 
ownership. However, the governance problem between the diversified holders of shares 
in the investment funds and the administrators of these funds became the most serious 
governance problem resulting in scandals and mismanagement in many countries with 
voucher mass privatization programs like Czech republic, Russia and Lithuania. Strong 
regulation of the funds was necessary to secure an efficient governance system. In the 
most advanced stages of transition it can be expected that investment funds and 
different institutional investors related to insurance, pension funds etc. will play a 
stronger role. Also diversified domestic shareholders wild get a more important role 
later in the consolidation stage with the parallel development of capital markets. Also 
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domestic blockholders will grow stronger during the transition. In some countries like 
Russia this happened quite fast with the oligarchs exploiting their personal network in 
relation to a weak state. On the negative side such capture of the state means high 
inequality, it may be a barrier for further reform, and crowd out other potential 
investors, both small entrepreneurs and foreign capital. On the positive side such 
concentrated ownership may result in strong governance and strengthening the 
restructuring process. 
Foreign ownership has strong advantages in relation to deep restructuring 
because of high supply of capital, management skills, technological know how, and 
international network. The evidence confirms the strong performance and restructuring 
abilities of foreign ownership. In a limited scale FDI can start already before the 
fundamental political changes, but the bulk of foreign investments have been related to 
large privatization in countries such as Hungary and Estonia. A general condition for 
attracting high foreign investments is advanced liberalization and stabilization of the 
economy and most important clear rules of the game. The hesitant and low foreign 
investments in countries like Russia are both the result of slow progress in the transition 
process and privatization methods favoring insiders and domestic investors. Foreign 
investments played a key role for restructuring in Hungary and Estonia. The positive 
effects include high capital supply, industrial upgrading, increased competition, and 
linking local production into advanced international production networks. Some of the 
capital-intensive infrastructure sectors have also received high foreign investment in 
many transitional economies, resulting in a technological jump into the information 
society. In the consolidation stage more green-field investments and acquisitions of 
existing private companies can be expected. Such acquisitions will make up the final 
point in the governance cycle from state ownership, to employee, to manager, to 
outsider/foreign ownership. 
 
Perspective and some policy recommendations  
There is no simple answer: to what is the best ownership structure for the 
efficient use of resources and for promotion of the necessary restructuring. It depends 
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on political priorities, stage of development, as well as specific cultural and 
technological conditions. The experience in Eastern Europe shows a great variety in 
governance structures, concerning the speed of privatization, the prevalence of state 
ownership, the division between insider and outsider ownership, the importance of 
employee ownership, and the openness for foreign investments. There is no simple 
recommendation concerning the optimal balance between the different forms. One 
successful country, Hungary, had much emphasis on foreign ownership and limited 
weight on employee ownership, while another success story, Slovenia, had strong 
emphasis on employee ownership and limited weight on foreign ownership.  
Some final policy recommendation for countries still in the early stages of transition: 
- Market orientation can be started already before the fundamental political 
changes. It cannot substitute real market reforms, but ease the following 
transition process. 
- Market orientation can include opening for employee and management owned 
enterprises already in the pre-transition stage.  
- Employee owned enterprises may be supported in the privatization process 
without problems for long term restructuring. Deep restructuring can be 
implemented in the employee owned enterprise, or ownership will change. 
- If long run survival of employee ownership is a priority, the institutional 
framework should be improved: rules for trading employee shares, training, 
consultancy, loans. 
- Good opportunities for manager ownership is necessary for a dynamic SME-
sector. Remove red tape, licensing, prohibitive taxation. 
- Clear rules of the game, simple and clear regulation. Lack of clarity and 
transparency opens up for corruption and capital flight and no restructuring. 
- Voucher privatization must be accompanied with regulation of investment funds. 
- Flexibility is needed for dynamic adjustment of ownership structures. Different 
structures must compete on the market on how resources can be used in the best 
way.  
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Table 1 Governance cycle: potential for different ownership types in different stages 
         \stage 
ownership 
early reforms 
no fundamental 
political change 
early transition 
liberalization 
small privatization 
large privatiz. 
institutional 
reform 
consolidation 
institutional reform 
deep restructuring 
state state dominant, 
experience with 
some autonomy 
stage of 
commercialization  
large enterprises 
main part of 
production 
privatized 
last privatizations 
some sectors still state 
owned 
employee introduction of 
market elements 
self-management 
start restructuring 
advantages for 
insiders in small 
privatization 
advantages for 
insiders in large 
privatization 
change to management  
consolidation human 
capital industries, 
support institutions 
manager individual firms 
start restructuring 
high potential for 
new management 
SMEs 
high potential 
management 
SMEs 
change to outside 
diversified/core 
diversified 
domestic 
outside 
no role no role voucher 
privatization  
governance? 
increasing role with 
development of 
capital market 
core 
domestic 
outside  
no role a few  developed from 
manager own. 
FIGs 
including diversified 
(minority) owners 
core 
foreign  
restricted JVs 
start restructuring 
first mover FDIs direct sale acquisitions/greenfield
integration into global 
production chains 
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